• City People Reveals His Game Plan

As Nigeria moves closer to the 2027 general election cycle, one question has been dominating political calculations across the country: How strong is President Bola Ahmed Tinubu in the 6 geopolitical zones, and can the incumbent translate his political advantages into enough votes for a second term?

At first glance, Tinubu enters the race with several important advantages. He is the incumbent president, controls the federal political machinery through the All Progressives Congress (APC), has retained Vice President Kashim Shettima as his running mate, and has benefited from the movement of several political heavyweights and governors towards the ruling party.

Recent reporting indicates that the APC has consolidated considerably.

Tinubu’s economic reforms, particularly the removal of the petrol subsidy and the unification/devaluation of the naira, have generated strong criticism because of their impact on household purchasing power and the cost of living.

Right now, economic hardship and insecurity remain among the major concerns of Nigerian voters, even as the government points to improved revenues and greater investor confidence.

The Opposition, meanwhile, has discovered that defeating an incumbent requires more than producing popular candidates. It requires Vote consolidation across regions.

That is where the 6 geopolitical zones become crucial.

The 2023 presidential election provides the most useful starting point. Tinubu won nationally with 8,794,726 votes, representing 36.61 per cent of valid votes. Peter Obi obtained 6,101,533 votes, while Atiku Abubakar scored 6,984,520. Tinubu’s strongest zone was the South-West, while Obi dominated the South-East, Atiku led the North-East and Rabiu Kwankwaso was a major force in Kano and parts of the North-West.

The question now is whether those political patterns will survive into 2027.

SOUTH-WEST: TINUBU’S STRONGEST TERRITORY

If the election were decided solely by the South-West, Tinubu would enter 2027 as a very strong favourite.

The region remains the president’s political heartland. In 2023, Tinubu won 2,279,407 votes in the South-West, representing 53.59 per cent of the zone’s valid votes. He won 6 of the 8 available electoral units in the zone’s 6 states, while Atiku won 2 and Peter Obi won one under the allocation reflected in the regional breakdown.

More importantly, Tinubu’s personal political history gives him an organisational advantage that few opponents can easily neutralise.

Lagos remains particularly important. As a former governor and the political figure who built a formidable political network in the state and across the region, Tinubu has an established structure that extends beyond the APC’s formal machinery.

The challenge for the opposition is therefore not merely to defeat Tinubu in the South-West but to reduce his margin.

That distinction is important.

Tinubu does not necessarily need to win every state in the region with overwhelming margins. What matters is whether his opponents can significantly reduce APC’s advantage in Lagos, Ogun, Osun, Ondo, Ekiti and Oyo.

The political developments of the next year will therefore be critical. Opposition parties are already trying to strengthen their structures in the region, while APC will be seeking to turn Tinubu’s incumbency into a broader electoral advantage.

The South-West is currently the president’s safest geopolitical base. Unless there is a major political realignment, Tinubu should remain the candidate to beat in the region.

But a strong South-West performance alone cannot guarantee re-election.

NORTH-WEST: THE BIGGEST BATTLEGROUND

The North-West may ultimately determine the 2027 presidential election.

The zone has the largest concentration of voters in the country and was critical to Tinubu’s victory in 2023. He secured 2,652,235 votes there, representing 39.64 per cent of valid votes. Atiku scored 2,329,540 votes, while Kwankwaso obtained 1,268,250.

This means something very important happened in 2023: the opposition vote was divided among several candidates.

Tinubu did not dominate the North-West in the way he dominated the South-West. Rather, he emerged ahead because his opponents divided the anti-APC vote.

That dynamic could become even more important in 2027.

The North-West contains states such as Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, Kebbi, Jigawa and Zamfara, where political structures, religious considerations, economic conditions and personalities can dramatically affect voting behaviour.

Kano is especially important.

Kwankwaso’s political machine demonstrated in 2023 that the North-West cannot automatically be treated as an APC stronghold. His NNPP captured a significant vote share, particularly in Kano.

Atiku also remains a major northern political figure.

The emergence of an opposition coalition therefore represents the biggest potential threat to Tinubu in the region. If Opposition parties enter the election separately, APC could benefit from another divided vote. If they manage to consolidate behind one candidate with strong northern appeal, Tinubu’s margins could come under serious pressure.

Security and the economy will also matter enormously.

The North-West has experienced serious insecurity, particularly banditry and kidnapping. Voters are likely to assess not only political personalities but also whether the federal government’s security policies have improved their daily lives.

The North-West is not guaranteed territory for Tinubu. However, the president has a realistic chance of remaining competitive—and potentially dominant in enough states—especially if the opposition remains divided.

NORTH-EAST: SHEETIMA’S HOME TURF, BUT NOT A GUARANTEED WIN

The North-East presents a different political equation.

The region is Vice President Kashim Shettima’s political base and includes Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba.

In 2023, Atiku won the region with 1,737,846 votes, or 50.58 per cent. Tinubu obtained 1,185,458 votes, or 34.50 per cent.

Therefore, the North-East is one of the areas where Tinubu needs to improve rather than simply defend.

The presence of Shettima on the ticket gives APC a major regional asset.

Shettima is a former governor of Borno State and has a substantial political network in the region. His political influence could be particularly important in Borno and neighbouring states.

However, the North-East also contains strong PDP traditions and personalities. Atiku’s influence in the region cannot be dismissed, particularly in Adamawa and other Northern states.

The bigger question is whether Atiku, Obi, Kwankwaso or another opposition candidate can consolidate the anti-Tinubu vote.

If the opposition fragments again, APC can improve its position without necessarily winning the zone outright.

If a single opposition candidate with strong northern credentials emerges, the North-East could become substantially more difficult for Tinubu.

Security will again be a major factor. The region has lived through years of insurgency, displacement and economic disruption. Voters will judge the administration by whether security conditions and livelihoods have improved.

Verdict: Competitive advantage for APC, but opposition remains dangerous

Tinubu’s ticket is stronger here than it was in 2023 because of Shettima’s presence, but the North-East cannot be regarded as automatic APC territory.

NORTH-CENTRAL: THE ZONE THAT COULD DECIDE THE MARGIN

The North-Central is perhaps the most politically fluid of Nigeria’s 6 zones.

It comprises Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger and Plateau, alongside the Federal Capital Territory in the conventional geopolitical classification.

In 2023, Tinubu won the zone with 1,760,993 votes, representing 38.58 per cent. Obi followed with 1,415,577 votes, while Atiku recorded 1,162,087.

This was not a comfortable victory.

The numbers reveal a region where 3 major political forces were capable of competing seriously.

The North-Central also possesses an important characteristic: it can swing between northern and southern political calculations.

The region is ethnically diverse and politically heterogeneous. Plateau and parts of Benue have demonstrated strong support for opposition candidates, while Kogi, Kwara and Niger have important APC structures.

The FCT is another crucial factor. Abuja has historically been politically unpredictable and has a relatively educated, mobile and politically conscious electorate.

Tinubu will want to preserve the 2023 advantage while preventing the Opposition from consolidating Obi and Atiku’s previous votes.

For the opposition, the region represents one of its best opportunities to weaken Tinubu without necessarily needing to dominate the North.

Tinubu starts with an advantage based on the 2023 numbers and APC’s current political strength, but the North-Central could produce significant surprises.

SOUTH-EAST: TINUBU’S WEAKEST ZONE

If there is one geopolitical zone where Tinubu faces his most difficult electoral challenge, it is the South-East.

The 2023 figures were dramatic.

Peter Obi won 1,952,998 votes in the zone, representing 87.78 per cent of valid votes. Tinubu received only 127,370 votes, or 5.72 per cent.

The problem for APC is therefore not simply that Tinubu lost the region.

He lost it overwhelmingly.

The South-East became the epicentre of Obi’s 2023 support and remains an area where his political movement has considerable emotional and generational appeal.

For Tinubu to substantially improve his position, APC would need to address several issues simultaneously: political representation, regional grievances, infrastructure, security, economic concerns and the perception that the South-East has not received adequate political attention.

The opposition, however, faces its own problem.

If Obi remains outside a unified opposition arrangement, the South-East could remain heavily tilted toward him. But if another candidate becomes the consensus opposition candidate, the dynamics could change.

Tinubu does not necessarily need to win the South-East to win nationally. However, the president needs to reduce the size of his defeat.

Moving from single-digit support to a substantially larger share of the regional vote would be strategically valuable to APC.

The South-East remains the president’s toughest geopolitical zone. His realistic objective is likely to reduce the opposition’s margin rather than expect a clean regional victory.

SOUTH-SOUTH: THE MOST OPEN SOUTHERN BATTLEGROUND

The South-South is arguably more unpredictable than the South-East.

In 2023, Obi won the zone with 1,210,675 votes, representing 42.37 per cent. Tinubu followed with 799,957 votes, or 27.99 per cent, while Atiku obtained 717,908 votes, or 25.12 per cent.

The region contains Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers.

Its political importance is enormous because of its population, oil-producing status and history of strong political networks.

But the South-South does not vote as one bloc.

Rivers, for example, has its own powerful political dynamics. Akwa Ibom has historically been associated with PDP structures, although APC has made significant advances. Cross River has become increasingly competitive. Edo has also demonstrated that political loyalties can change rapidly.

Tinubu’s biggest opportunity in the South-South is the strength of APC’s federal incumbency and its growing political network.

The region could therefore become one of the places where political alliances made between now and election day have enormous consequences.

Tinubu can make significant gains in the South-South because of the role of Nyesom Wike’s Rainbow Coalition, but expecting a repeat of the South-West’s dominance would be unrealistic.